vi sion of the flight surgeon, has been sanc tioned by some compo nents of the Air Force since 1960 and by the tacti cal air forces un til 1991. In March 1991, fol low ing success ful com ple tion of Opera tion Desert Storm, the chief of staff of the Air Force sent a message ter mi nat ing the policy of allow ing in--flight medi ca tions, includ ing ampheta mines, by Air Force person nel.
This arti cle briefly outlines the histori cal de vel op ment, mechanism of action, and ef fects of ampheta mine on normal person nel. It then discusses the value of these agents in mili tary opera tions, the safety record, and the concerns that may have been the impe tus for banning their use. Finally, it con cludes that, in light of their value to mission ac com plish ment-es pe cially in the absence of demon stra ble negative effects-the ban on am pheta mines should be rescinded.
In light of their value to mission
ac com plish ment-es pe cially in the absence of demon stra ble nega tive effects-the ban on am petheta mines should be re scinded.
Am pheta mine is one member of a family of synthetic drugs, similar in chemical struc ture to the neuro trans mit ters adrenalin and nora drena lin. Ampheta mine is known to en hance the release of naturally occur ring neu ro trans mit ters that affect central nerv ous system neurons (i.e., the brain) and that are involved with periph eral neuro trans mis sion (such as nervous control of muscu lar con trac tions). Ampheta mine in particu lar was noted for its striking "central ef fect"-that of enhanced alertness, with rela tively minor physiologi cal effects on blood pres sure, heart rate, or gastric motil ity. 1 Am pheta mine became commer cially available for prescrip tion in 1937. Able to decrease ap pe tite markedly in almost all species, it rap idly found favor as a treatment for a number of condi tions, includ ing obesity and narco lepsy. 2 Other condi tions that oc ca sion ally improve with ampheta mine usage in clude hyper ac tiv ity in children, depres sion, and some types of parkin son ism. 3 By 1938, ampheta mine was a very commonly pre scribed medica tion. 4 It was consid ered very safe and was widely used for a vari ety of physical and mental disor ders. However, within a short time, physi cians deter mined that ampheta mine's ability to suppress ap pe tite decreases markedly with contin ued usage, requir ing higher and higher doses to main tain the same effect on food intake. Overdose (usually greater than one hun dred milli grams) can cause mood changes. 5 They also noted other unde sir able side effects that occur with chronic, increas ing use, includ ing insom nia, psycho sis, eupho ria, and paranoia. Ad di tion ally, when high doses of ampheta mine are ingested, in haled, or injected, signi fi cant moodaltering effects occur, which explains why am pheta mine became a drug of choice to abuse in the 1960s and 1970s. 6 These unde sir able traits led to the strict control of am pheta mine drugs, as is the case today.
Some military services recog nized the poten tial of psychostimu lants to combat fa tigue and boredom. The greatest use of the drug report edly occurred during World War II by German, Japanese, and English troops. 7 Al though American troops report edly did not have access to the drugs, studies were ini ti ated in the late 1940s and 1950s to de ter mine the military signifi cance. The re sults among healthy subjects were re marka bly consis tent: in numer ous studies us ing normal, nonfatigued human volun teers-in clud ing some military person nel-am pheta mine improved per form ance by about 5 percent on most mental tasks. Reac tion time and hand--eye coor di na tion were most signifi cantly improved. Similarly, am pheta mine admini stra tion restored mental per form ance of sleep--deprived subjects to non de prived levels. 8 Addi tion ally, almost all studies found improve ment in physical strength and endur ance. 9 In conjunc tion with other drugs, ampheta mine proved very ef fec tive for treating motion and space sick ness, allow ing missions to continue that would other wise have been termi nated. 10 None of the experi ments showed a decrease in mental or physical perform ance of nor mal subjects taking ampheta mine.
Al though ampheta mine possi bly was available during the Korean conflict, the Air Force did not sanction its use until 1960. At that time, Strate gic Air Command (SAC) ap proved limited use of ampheta mine, and Tac ti cal Air Command (TAC) followed in 1962. The first widespread use by US mili tary aircrews probably took place during the Viet nam War. Although written documen ta tion is almost en tirely absent, inter views with Air Force and Army pilots who used am pheta mine during this time give us a picture of a drug that permit ted an extended duty day as well as increased vigilance during flight opera tions.
Side effects described by these pilots in clude feelings of nervous ness, loss of appe tite, and in abil ity to sleep. Master Warrant Of fi cer Lance McElhiney, a 20--year--old Co bra gunship pilot in Vietnam, states that some kind of "upper" was available like candy; he reports essen tially no control over the dose or frequency of use. 11 Col Paco Geis ler, USAF, Retired, used ampheta mine as an F--4 pilot during the Vietnam War and later as an F--15 squadron commander dur ing Opera tion Just Cause. He notes that "the differ ence in the two situations was amaz ing. I don't know if the differ ence is dose or drug formu la tion or what. But there were no notice able side effects during Just Cause; we just felt wide awake. But there was none of the nervous ness-no feeling `wired' like I remem ber in Viet nam." 12 Medi cally controlled use of prescrip tionqual ity, small doses almost assur edly ac counts for the differ ence that Colonel Geisler reports.
The policies concern ing stimulants ulti mately evolved into Air Force Regula tion (AFR) 161--33/TAC Supple ment 1. TAC sanctioned the use of ampheta mine because single--seat pilots are particu larly sus cep ti ble to the effects of boredom and fa tigue during deploy ments overseas and dur ing extended combat air patrols. Maj David Caskey, an Air Force F--15 pilot, reported using "go" pills routinely when fly ing from the United States to Germany, Ja pan, or Thailand. He recounted that some pi lots refused to take them, saying they did n't need them; however, he pointed out that one time, an entire flight diverted to a base in England because some pilots simply could n't stay awake en route to their desti na tion in Germany. 13
There is no evidence that aviators at tempt to abuse ampheta mine if the medica tion is occa sion ally made avail able.
There is no evidence that aviators attempt to abuse ampheta mine if the medica tion is oc ca sion ally made available. And there is vir tu ally no similar ity between the effects of high dosages or chronic ampheta mine abuse among addicts and occa sional, lowdose admini stra tion of the same drug to mili tary pilots involved in extended operations. 14 First, mili tary aircrews are a wellscreened, intel li gent, moti vated, and mentally healthy popula tion. A remarka bly low in ci dence of any sort of addic tive behav ior or other mental pa thol ogy occurs in this popu la tion. Second, the medica tion is ad min is tered on a case--by--case basis by a flight surgeon working closely with the pilots and under the direc tion of the squadron com mander. The commander or flight sur geon would likely note unusual person al ity traits, increased drug--seeking behav ior, weight loss, or any other indi ca tion of mal adap ta tion on the part of the pilots. Third, be cause the source of the medica tion is a phy si cian and military pharmacy, the pilot is not exposed to the drug counter cul ture that 56 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1997 he or she would encoun ter by obtain ing the drugs ille gally. Thus, there is no increased avail abil ity of ampheta mine (or any other drug) for excess or recrea tional use.
De ter min ing the effect of ampheta mine use on safety is not possi ble because of a lack of appli ca ble reports. Aeromedical afteraction reports of Opera tions Desert Shield/ De sert Storm, however, attempted to quantify am pheta mine use. 15 Data from anonymous ques tion naires found that, of the pilots who re sponded, 65 percent of them used am pheta mine during the deploy ment to thea ter, and 57 percent used it at least once dur ing the air war. No one reported adverse side effects, and over 60 percent of the pilots who used the drug said it was "essen tial" to mission accom plish ment.
Of the Class A mishaps occur ring during De sert Shield/Desert Storm, several were parti ally attrib uted to pilot fatigue, and no pilots were using ampheta mine at the time of any mishap. Addi tion ally, there have been no acci dents, during training or actual de ployment to a theater, in which ampheta mine use by the aircrew was either reported or found to be a factor during the acci dent in ves tigation. Last, there have to date been no medi cal disquali fi ca tions for drug use among aircrews who had previ ously received ampheta mine opera tion ally. Thus, although one cannot prove an improve ment in safety, one can say with some degree of certainty that there has been no negative effect.
Us ing drugs to enhance per form ance in sports may be "im moral," but war is not a sport ing event.
Re cent labora tory stud ies compar ing dex tro am pheta mine with place bos in terms of their effect on maintain ing perform ance and alert ness in fatigued military pilots have dem on strated clear benefits, confirm ing ear lier results in nonpi lot volun teers. 16 Heli cop ter pilots who received place bos and then flew a simu la tor from 0100 to 1700 hours after a single night of sleep depri va tion displayed sig nifi cant, progres sive dete rio ra tion of flight--con trol skills that would have threatened both safety and mission ac com plish ment. The problems encoun tered were espe cially severe in the morning hours (0300-1000). Even after a slight improve ment in the after noon (due to circadian rhythm), control accu racy did not recover to nor mal prefatigue levels. When these pilots re ceived ampheta mine on a differ ent sleepdeprived night, decre ments in perform ance did not occur. In fact, low--dose ampheta mine eliminated the early morning dete rio ra tions in flight skills and maintained per form ance at prefatigue level for the remain der of the day.
If psychostimu lants improve perform ance ef fec tively and safely, why is there still resis tance to their use-and why did the policy change in 1991? The answer seems to be infor ma tional, emotional, and politi cal. Most pol icy makers are igno rant of the facts con cern ing the effects of limited, low--dose admin is tra tion of ampheta mine on normal per son nel. Some people are concerned that crew members might abuse the drug and thus become psycho logi cally or physically ad dicted or toler ant. Others are con cerned about commander abuse-that instead of allow ing reason able crew rest and en dur ance policies, command ers might rely on stimulants to get super hu man effort out of their subor di nates.
These concerns, though deserv ing of thought, go against the prepon der ance of evi dence collected to date. As noted above, we have not been able to identify a single dis quali fi ca tion for ampheta mine use by Air Force aircrews. Although "command abuse" evi dently was a problem in World War II and possi bly Vietnam, we believe that strict regu la tions and vastly improved training of our com mand ers will continue to prevent abuse-just as we have faith that other prob lems from the Vietnam era will not recur.
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There is no evidence of command abuse dur ing recent deploy ments or during opera tions in Libya, Grenada, Panama, or the Per sian Gulf.
The two other poten tial concerns are less logi cal but probably more compel ling. First, some people harbor an ill--defined feel ing that perform ance enhance ment by chemi cal means is "immoral," a senti ment evi dent in myriad regula tions prohib it ing drug use by athletes, although such use would indeed enhance perform ance. The sec ond reason is clearly politi cal: military lead ers are under standa bly concerned about mis in for ma tion that could be engen dered by press accounts of pilot use of ampheta mines. In light of the current efforts in drug control, some parties might accuse the Air Force of impos ing a double standard.
These are real is tic concerns, but they do not justify prohib it ing the use of centrally act ing stimulants in the military. Using drugs to enhance perform ance in sports may be "im moral," but war is not a sporting event. Suc cess in combat is not a question of fair ness but of power; our weapons and training are designed to maximize combat power. We do not seek to equalize each side's chance of success prior to initi at ing contact (as we do in sports), but we do seek to obtain every ad van tage for our forces. However, this does not mean that we should rely upon am pheta mine indis crimi nately to create a perfor mance edge on every day of com bat opera tions. As with most things in life, we should consid er costs and benefits prior to taking specific actions in various situa tions.
Al though properly admin is tered doses of am pheta mine can alle vi ate signifi cant prob lems in very demand ing circum stances (e.g., they can sustain the perform ance of heavily fa tigued, sleep--deprived person nel in com bat), an indis crimi nate, daily reli ance on am pheta mine may quickly create more nega tive than positive effects. Routine admini stra tion of stimulants under "normal" cir cumstances may create problems of drug tol er ance, addic tion, and various forms of abuse-not to mention physiologi cal changes (in terms of sleep disrup tion and other side effects) that would ulti mately ren der person nel less effec tive. However, if am pheta mine ad mini stra tion is well controlled and restricted to those short--to moderateterm circum stances requir ing severely fa tigued person nel to perform continu ously, the medica tion may make the differ ence between a mission completed safely and effec tively, and one that ends in disas ter.
In combat, pilots unques tiona bly are respon si ble for accom plish ing the mission. The issue in this case becomes whether they fall asleep at the controls or whether they avoid disas ter by using a drug that enables them to stay awake, maintain vigilance, and safely complete the mission.
Un for tu nately, the elimina tion of am pheta mine use has put aircrews at increased ac tual risk for the sake of eliminat ing theo reti cal risk.
Mili tary leaders are justi fied in their con cern about publi c reac tion to disclo sure of the military's use of performanceenhancing drugs. The answer may lie in clas si fy ing our involve ment to avoid media ex ploi ta tion, educat ing our leaders and pub li c concern ing the unique military value of these medications, or employ ing some com bi na tion of these or other approaches. Un for tu nately, the elimina tion of ampheta mine use has put aircrews at increased ac-58 AIRPOWER JOURNAL SPRING 1997 tual risk for the sake of eliminat ing theo reti cal risk-a deci sion that does not pass the test of common sense and therefore should be changed.
